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Ambassador's Speeches

 

As published in Kibris Newspaper...

(English text)

The Annan Plan: Securing Cyprus' Future for All

Op-Ed by Ambassador Michael Klosson

Monday, October 6, 2003

 

This is a crucial period in this island’s history, which, we hope, will result in the secure settlement that has eluded many decades of past attempts.  This moment demands level-headed thinking, realism and courage, not fantasy or deception, if the opportunity is to be seized before time runs out.

 

Decision Time to Secure the Future

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The appropriate, necessary and workable compromise arrangements for a settlement that protects the rights of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are embodied in the UN Secretary General’s settlement plan.  The choice before both sides now is to accept the solution embodied in the Annan Plan or to live with no solution for the foreseeable future.

 

The way forward is clear.  With the support of Turkey and Greece, the two sides should commit to negotiate the Annan Plan and put it to the two communities in parallel referenda within a specific time period.  The Annan Plan is not a “trap” sprung on one side by the other.  The plan itself has a long pedigree in UN proposals, including provisions accepted in the past by the Turkish Cypriot side.

 

Misperceptions and Realities

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One of the difficulties in evaluating a settlement based on the Annan plan is the considerable amount of misinformation – even disinformation – circulating about the plan itself.  In making their own evaluation, it important that people have a clear understanding of the plan’s provisions.   One reliable source is the Secretary General’s April 1 report to the Security Council on his Good Offices mission in Cyprus, which can be found on the UN website (www.un.org), and our embassy website, http://www.americanembassy.org.cy/.  This UN document explains clearly what the Secretary General in his own words thinks his plan does to protect the rights of all on this island.

 

I frequently hear four common fears or misperceptions about the Annan plan.  Let me address them:

 

Some say the Annan Plan does not take into account the realities of the island.  This is the first misperception, and it’s false.  On the contrary, the Plan explicitly enshrines the principle of bi-zonality, asserts the political equality of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and declares the two constituent states of the United Cyprus Republic are of equal status.  The plan is based on a partnership of equals.

 

The principle of bi-zonality is implemented and protected through numerous concrete safeguards. For example, the plan provides for a gradual approach to the establishment of residency by Greek Cypriots who return to the Turkish Cypriot State.  For six years, there would be a total moratorium  (with certain exceptions).  After that, limitations could be imposed by the constituent states so that even after 15 years, new residencies could be limited if 21% of the population in any given village hailed from the other constituent state.

 

Misperception Number 2 is that the plan will enable the Greek Cypriot majority to dominate the Turkish Cypriot “minority” and erase Turkish Cypriots from the island.  Fortunately, just the opposite is the case.  The Annan Plan includes multi-layered safeguards designed to protect -- not diminish -- the rights of Turkish Cypriots.  Those safeguards include:  the equal status of the two constituent states; the equal number of senators hailing from each constituent state; rotation of the chair of the Presidential Council among all its six members, two of whom must be Turkish Cypriots.

What does that mean more concretely? It means: a Turkish Cypriot will be the leader of the Presidential Council at least one-third of the time; no decision can be taken at any level or in any federal organ without substantial support from both constituent states.

 

Look also at the distribution of responsibility within the governing structure.  The federal government is empowered with the minimum authority necessary to ensure a coherent international personality and to function effectively as a member of the European Union.  Virtually all matters important to individuals, those functions of government that most directly affect peoples’ lives -- such as education, health, direct taxation, industry, agriculture, transport, social security, the court system, and the police -- are vested in the constituent states.   That means: under the Annan plan, Turkish Cypriots will continue to have control over their daily lives in their own region.

 

Moreover, political rights at the federal level are to be exercised on the basis of internal constituent state citizenship status.  So Greek Cypriots who would live in the north -- a number which is expressly limited by the terms of the Plan -- would not necessarily become citizens of the Turkish Cypriot State;  they would thus continue to vote in the Greek Cypriot State.  In short, under the Annan plan, the Turkish Cypriot State would be the self-administered and political equal of the Greek Cypriot one, controlling its own political processes and territory.

 

A third argument claims that the Annan Plan would end the Turkish security guarantee.  Wrong again.  The Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance will continue, not end.  The scope of the Treaty of Guarantee, in fact, is enlarged to embrace the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the two constituent states.  That is an important enhancement, not diminution of Turkey’s guarantee.  The number of Turkish troops allowed under the Treaty of Alliance will increase from 650 to 6,000 until Turkey itself joins the EU. A similar increase, of course, applies to Greece.  In addition, a UN force will remain on the island to assist the parties with implementation of the settlement and to prevent any misunderstanding or incidents in the early going.  The UN mandate, however, does not in any way diminish the rights and obligations of the guarantor powers.

 

The Fourth Fear :  one hears often that if the Annan Plan is adopted, half the population of the north will become refugees for the fourth time.  That rhetoric grabs headlines, but it is also false.  Under the plan, some people will have to move as a result of the return of some territory to the Greek Cypriot side.  Not half, but some.  But remember this: every feasible solution proposed during decades of UN talks, including even those supported in the past by the Turkish Cypriot side, has envisaged a territorial adjustment, thus relocation of some people.  Promising no one will move is simply to promise there will be no solution ever.

 

The number of people who potentially will be affected by the Annan Plan, however, is far less than half of the population of the north.  According to the Secretary General’s April report and UN estimates, based on the 1996 census in the north, as many as 47,000 people could need to relocate as a result of the territorial adjustment, not the 100,000 as some assert.  However, only half of the 47,000 would actually need to move to entirely different places.  For the other half, those who live in Famagusta would likely move within their own town and those in Morphou/Guzelyurt to a suitable place nearby where they would still be able to farm the orange groves they currently farm.

 

Since much of the burden of a settlement will fall on to the backs of those people who do have to move and do not have sufficient resources, it is only appropriate that the plan, the federal government and the international community address their needs.   That is why the international community has made clear that assistance will be made available to facilitate a settlement and ease the transition.

 

The costs of a settlement – although real – can be managed, and international aid will help smooth the inevitable disruptions of change.  As recently as the end of May during his visit to the island, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development reiterated the commitment of the United States to participate in the donors’ conference the EU will organize and also to contribute financially.  A settlement, according to economic studies, will stimulate economic growth to the benefit of all residents of the island.

 

Each person must make up his mind whether to accept the Annan plan and join Europe, or forego a solution and remain outside Europe.  As you do so, I would urge that people trust in their best hopes rather than surrender to their worst fears.  Ask yourselves, “Will my children and grandchildren be better off in 10 years living in a united Cyprus where my rights are safeguarded and truly part of Europe?  Or will they be better off living in an ambiguous situation on a divided island with clouds of uncertainty over their heads?”

 

The United States does not want to see a return to the dark days before 1974; we are convinced that the Annan Plan provides safeguards for all people on the island to be able to trust in their hopes and enjoy the benefits of joining Europe.