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The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative:
An Opportunity Lost

Remarks by Ambassador Michael Klosson
IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium
on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution
June 29, 2004
Nicosia

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you today U.S. support for the most concentrated and intensive UN effort ever to promote a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. I know the focus of your symposium is on problems in the Middle East.  However,  as students of negotiation and conflict resolution pursuing a program in Nicosia, you might also look for lessons in the decades-long UN effort to help Greek and Turkish Cypriots resolve their problem.

The UN peace and reunification plan was supported in the April 24 referenda by an overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots and rejected by an even larger, overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots.  We were disappointed by this outcome and agree with UN Secretary General Annan that it represents another missed opportunity to solve the Cyprus problem.  The implications of this vote by the people on both sides -– which we obviously respect -- are only beginning to be absorbed.  The way forward, despite our continued support for a solution, remains unclear absent reconsideration by Greek Cypriots.

What I would like to do this afternoon is to discuss why the U.S. was so actively involved in supporting the UN effort, the unique opportunity we saw to achieve a solution this time, the Annan Plan and our support for it, and where we go from here.

U.S. Interests in a Cyprus Settlement

The stakes for the United States in a settlement are clear and important.  They were the reason for high level U.S. engagement -- from the President and Secretary of State on down -- over the past four years when we saw a clear window for a solution. In fact, some of my diplomatic colleagues in Nicosia regularly observed how impressed they were by how the U.S. worked to support the UN effort so actively and at such senior levels despite a daunting global agenda of other pressing issues.

From our perspective, a comprehensive settlement would benefit Cypriots from one end of the island to another, economically, politically and culturally.  If the two sides were able to resolve their differences, Cyprus’s full potential would be unleashed rather than continue to be impaired by the all-consuming focus on “the problem. ”A settlement would resolve an important dispute between two NATO allies, a dispute that in the past harmed NATO cohesion. It would greatly facilitate Turkey’s European aspirations, and send a powerful signal to the world about reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. In sum, a settlement would be a win-win for all the parties, and make a vital contribution, with international ramifications, to peace, stability and prosperity in a critical region.

Window of Opportunity

We also assessed that there was a constellation of forces over the past four and a half years creating the best opportunity ever for achieving a settlement.  Our interests and the specific opportunity we saw justified our high-level commitment to help the UN Secretary General’s Good Offices Mission succeed.

What were the elements that led to this assessment? There were four.  First and foremost was the desire of all Cypriots – Greek and Turkish alike – and  Turkey to join the European Union (EU).  In this most recent phase of UN efforts, Europe was a strong catalyst for a comprehensive solution. The EU accession process provided a timeline to help drive the settlement efforts forward.  The prospect of EU membership gave the UN a context of balanced incentives for all parties within which to promote a settlement.

Cyprus’s EU membership was the action-forcing event, which distinguished this UN effort from all past attempts. The European Union repeatedly made clear its preference for accession of a reunited Cyprus this past April, and noted that a settlement would also facilitate Turkey’s own membership aspirations.  Greek Cypriots regularly reiterated their desire for a reunited Cyprus to join the EU.  Unfortunately, by the time Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side revised their position on the UN initiative earlier this year, the incentives for compromise on the Greek Cypriot side had substantially weakened because Cyprus had already signed the EU Treaty of Accession in 2003.  Turkish Cypriots, both in the April referenda and in last December’s legislative elections, demonstrated majority support for EU membership via a settlement.  The UN Secretary General has also pointed to the support he received from Greece and the Turkish Government elected in November 2002, which engineered a change in policy.  In fact, Prime Minister Erdogan’s government made EU membership a top national priority, and seeks to open accession negotiations as soon as possible. 

The second major element enhancing the prospects for a settlement was the UN initiative called the Annan Plan.  Tabled in November 2002 and negotiated over the past 18 months, the plan was fully supported by the UN Security Council in April 2003 as the unique basis for further negotiations.  The Annan Plan is the most comprehensive and detailed proposal of its kind, and represented a careful balancing of both sides’ core concerns.  It provided both a blueprint for a functioning government and a roadmap to a brighter future in the European Union for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The third factor enhancing prospects was the Turkish Cypriot side’s decision in April 2003 to relax restrictions across the buffer zone.  That initiative had an overwhelmingly positive impact on the island’s atmosphere.  With over three million crossings to date, we have seen no serious incidents between the two communities.  With this huge boost in interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after decades of separation, the prospect of a solution became more concrete.  The experience of the past year, moreover, defied claims that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could not work together or live in peace in modern day Europe.

The fourth development that opened up the possibility of a solution was the unprecedented political ferment we have seen in north Cyprus coupled with the change in policy engineered by the Turkish Government of Prime Minister Erdogan. The momentum engendered by unprecedented, pro-solution Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in early 2003, specifically calling on the authorities to support the Annan plan, was carried from the street into the ballot box in last December’s legislative elections. Pro-solution parties outpolled the establishment parties that campaigned against the UN peace plan.  This vote brought forth new Turkish Cypriot political leadership, and this leadership clearly favored a solution based on negotiating the UN plan in order to join Europe as part of a united Cyprus.  Turkey during this period also elaborated its new approach that a “non solution” was not a solution.  In his January meeting with UN Secretary General Annan, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan conveyed Turkey’s new policy on Cyprus, favoring a resumption of UN negotiations based on the Annan plan.

The Annan Plan

Let me make a few brief comments on the Annan Plan for those of you less familiar with its content.  The plan represents a culmination of UN efforts over the years to address key issues dividing the sides – security, sovereignty, governance, territory, and property -- within the agreed context of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.  If you had been on the island this past year and listened to statements by some Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political leaders, you would have gotten the impression that the UN plan either accommodated all Greek Cypriot concerns at the expense of Turkish Cypriots or sold out Greek Cypriot interests to satisfy Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.  Neither claim is true. Like any effort to resolve a decades-old conflict, the UN plan represents a compromise, one that the Secretary General, the U.S. and other Security Council members considered carefully balanced. It called for sacrifices on both sides, especially by the up to 60,000 Turkish Cypriots who would have had to move as a result of territory and homes returned to Greek Cypriots.

The plan, first tabled in November 2002, went through five iterations and was the product of many months of talks between the parties.  In the last phase, kicked off this past February, the parties, together with Greece and Turkey, agreed to a three-phased negotiation process that was to culminate in finalization of the plan in March and simultaneous referenda in April.  First the parties tried with UN assistance to negotiate their differences.  Then Greece and Turkey lent their assistance.  Finally, given the inability of the parties to reach agreement between themselves, the UN Secretary General exercised the role given him by the parties to resolve continuing deadlocks and to finalize the plan, which the parties finally agreed would be put to simultaneous referenda on April 24.

In his May 28 report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General summarized the main improvements made to his plan as a result of this final phase of the negotiations in February and March.  For the Greek Cypriots, the finalized plan was significantly improved to address their concerns regarding:

-- the functionality of the federal government as a EU member,

-- whether Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would keep their end of the bargain,

-- security,

-- the rights of those dispossessed or displaced as a result of 1974,

-- permanent derogations from EU law and regulations, and

-- citizenship, especially of Turkish nationals who had settled in Cyprus.  

For Turkish Cypriots, the plan was improved to address their concerns regarding:

-- the bizonal character of the settlement,

-- safeguarding of their political equality

-- legal security of the settlement from challenge in European courts

-- security, and

-- displacement of nearly one quarter of Turkish Cypriots as a result of the territorial settlement.

U.S. Support for the UN Settlement Effort

Given our interests in a solution and the promising window of opportunity we saw, the United States played a very active role during this period to promote conditions that would help the UN effort to succeed.  Far from imposing a settlement from the outside, our role was to provide diplomatic support and assistance to the UN effort and to contribute to conditions on the island that would facilitate a settlement.  President Bush, Secretary Powell, senior State Department officials, Special Cyprus Coordinator Weston, our embassy here in Nicosia and our embassies in Europe all worked vigorously to resolve the Cyprus problem.

Our diplomatic assistance took the form of regular discussions with the parties, Greece, Turkey, the UN and EU, and other governments. We sought to understand the concerns and priorities of the parties, suggest ways they might be addressed, and marshal support for such solutions.  During the critical period between February and April, we were especially active in encouraging accommodations of key concerns of both sides in order to improve prospects for the outcome we sought – a twin “yes” vote in the two referenda, by which Cypriots themselves would embrace the solution.

We also backed our diplomacy with our pocketbook. Any settlement involves substantial costs, including relocating up to one quarter of all Turkish Cypriots as a result of territory and homes being turned over to Greek Cypriots.  At a pre-donors conference in Brussels in April organized by the European Commission, the United States pledged to contribute $400 million -- by far the largest pledge made -- to facilitate implementation of the UN plan.  

Over the years, we have also worked on the island to help our diplomatic efforts bear fruit.  Since the 1980s, the United States has contributed over $300 million to support bicommunal activities in Cyprus.  This is a sound investment in a better future for all Cypriots. In addition to a multi-million dollar scholarship program, each year we fund dozens of programs in areas as wide-ranging as teaching English, improving healthcare, helping the handicap and restoring historic buildings -- all designed not only to make Cyprus a better place in which to live, but also to bring the two communities together, to help them relearn habits of cooperation and to foster reconciliation and education.  In the wake of the referenda, it is clear that such work must continue, and more needs to be done by leaders on the island to prepare the people for the difficult but necessary compromises.

The Road Ahead

So where does this leave Cyprus?  What is the way forward?

First, the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan represents a major setback and raises fundamental questions about their commitment to a federal solution.  Greek Cypriot leaders have explained that by this vote, Greek Cypriots rejected a specific plan, not the concept of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution itself, which has been the agreed basis for over twenty-five years of UN settlement efforts.  While that may be the case, many Turkish Cypriots now question whether Greek Cypriots are indeed prepared to share the island with them.  

The vote and other polling data also make clear that much work remains to be done on the Greek Cypriot side to build public support for the necessarily painful compromises that a federal solution will entail.  The Greek Cypriots’ commitment to such a solution needs to be demonstrated.  The best way to do so, in our view, would be to support the Secretary General’s call – which we strongly endorse – for the international community to take steps to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.  

Easing their isolation will encourage Turkish Cypriots to remain committed to a settlement and reunification. For our part, the United States is working to implement the Secretary General’s recommendation on this score.  We are working in parallel with our EU partners on measures to promote economic development of north Cyprus in order to facilitate an eventual settlement and reunification of Cyprus within the EU. Let me make clear that diplomatic recognition of north Cyprus is not in the cards.  Despite impressions prevalent on this island that a gain for one side necessarily means a setback for the other, this is not a zero sum game.  On the contrary, narrowing disparities between the north and south will enhance the prospects for reunification.

Second, the Secretary General has made clear there is no basis for resuming his Good Offices Mission as long as the current stalemate persists.  We agree. The prospects for reunification thus rest primarily in Cypriot hands.

President Papadopoulos has said that the Greek Cypriot side seeks to negotiate additional changes to the plan, while the Turkish Cypriot side is opposed to reopening the plan for negotiations, since a majority of Turkish Cypriots supported it in their referendum.  The Annan Plan has not gone away, however, and it is hard to foresee any future solution, if one can indeed be achieved, outside the balance of trade-offs it represents.  As Greek Cypriots gain a greater sense of security as a result of their EU membership, perhaps their views of an acceptable settlement will evolve.  To the extent that Greek Cypriot concerns about security and implementation of the plan are the main obstacles standing in the way of a solution, we are prepared to work with our Security Council partners to address them, as recommended by the Secretary General, once they are articulated with clarity and finality.

Third, the Secretary General has called for a fundamental reassessment of UN peace activities in Cyprus.  The Security Council earlier this month welcomed his intention to submit recommendations within three months on the current peacekeeping operation.  We support a close re-examination of UNFICYP in light of the referenda and Cyprus’s membership in the European Union.

Fourth, the conflicting results of the twin referenda point up the continued lack of a common outlook on the part of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  More direct contact between the two sides at a people-to-people level is required to puncture myths and eliminate stereotypes that obstruct building a commitment to a shared future.  Through our assistance programs, we intend to help where we can to support such interaction and reconciliation.

Conclusion

Stepping back a bit from the very intense effort that was just concluded, certain things are clear:

 First, the history of efforts to solve the Cyprus problem, including this one, demonstrates that the parties themselves are unable -- at least to date -- to negotiate for or by themselves a mutually acceptable solution. Even with support of the international community, moreover, there can’t be a solution unless leaders both in and out of government summon the courage to accept difficult compromises and explain them to the people. That means that neither party can compel the other to accept a solution contrary to its perceived fundamental interests.  Nor can either side camp on maximalist positions in the expectation that the other side will cave.

Second, the longer the problem persists, the harder it gets to solve.  The absence of a solution is not cost free for either side.  Restrictions obviously retard development in north Cyprus, but uncertainty about the future continues to casts a shadow over the entire island, inhibiting Cypriots from achieving their full potential as a tourist destination, as bridge to the Middle East and as a regional business platform.  The lack of certainty engenders a sense of insecurity, which only a settlement can dispel.  The lack of a solution also complicates Cyprus’s membership in the EU, absorbing energy and creativity that otherwise could be focused on other issues.  In sum, although this is not widely recognized in all quarters on the island, the benefits of a comprehensive settlement are more compelling than holding to vain hopes of achieving unrealistic expectations.

In conclusion, the U.S. stands ready to assist in future efforts to promote a Cyprus solution if conditions present themselves.  We have been through the best opportunity to date for a settlement; it’s unclear whether a balanced context of incentives will again present itself and be capitalized on by far-sighted leadership on both sides.  It is clearly up to the people and their leadership to find the way forward.